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Abstract
Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) in exist-
ing deployments is a collection of inter-connected
avionics equipment supported by wired technology,
with stringent reliability and safety requirements. If
the inter-connecting wires are physically secured so
that a malicious user cannot access them directly,
then this simplifies the security management of the
network. However, substituting the wired network
with a wireless network – also referred to as an
Avionics Wireless Network (AWN) – brings a set of
new challenges related to assurance, reliability, and
security; even for a specific set of well-defined and
non-critical tasks. The AWN has to ensure that it
provides at a minimum the existing required levels
of safety offered by the equivalent wired network.
These challenges are underpinned by a necessity to
boot the AWN to a secure and trusted state, before
it can be used to bridge different parts of the IMA
in an aircraft. In this paper, we discuss the security
and trust challenges an AWN boot process might face,
along with highlighting a potential solution. Finally,
the paper evaluates the proposed validation solution
that meets the stated security requirements, based on
the security challenges discussed.
Introduction
In existing digital avionics, individual devices are
linked via wired connections. A potential alternative
to the wired network is wireless, specifically an
Avionics Wireless Network (AWN) [1]. In a restricted
network environment, where all participants are vetted
(offline) beforehand, managing security and trust is
relatively easy in comparison to a dynamic network
where prior vetting becomes impractical. Therefore,
challenges of security and trust are unique in some
respects in the avionics industry. In addition, a failure
in security and trust in avionics industry might have
severe consequences. Therefore, for an AWN we
require (and recommend) robust technological mech-
anisms to assess and associate trust with individual
entities. In this paper, the trust established using
technological means, in whole or in part, is referred
to as “digital trust”.
Similar to the diversification of computer sys-
tems, digital trust also comes in several different
incarnations. Each computing domain has defined and
articulated the notion of digital trust in a specific
manner that satisfies its requirements. Therefore, the
assumption that digital trust will have a single defini-
tion is difficult to substantiate. Individual definitions
of digital trust might be valid in their respective
domains. However, issues arise when a definition of
trust in one domain is applied to a different domain
without adequately adjusting it, as for example, in the
notion of digital trust related to computer security
via provenance [2], [3]. Such concerns are rare but
nonetheless exist.
In the field of information security, the measure-
ment and validation of digital trust and trustworthi-
ness play crucial roles. The foundation of secure and
trusted computing1 can be argued to be based on the
effectiveness of digital trust evaluation and validation
mechanisms [8]. In such a reliability-critical and
security-sensitive environment as an AWN, verifica-
tion/validation of digital trust is crucial.
Digital Trust
The definition of trust, taken from Merriam Web-
ster’s online dictionary2 is a “belief that someone or
something is reliable, good, honest, effective, etc."
Based on this, we generically define digital trust
as “a trust based either on past experience or evidence
1Secure and Trusted Computing: This term refers to the efforts
made toward enabling technologies to ascertain trust in a device’s
state and security. For example, Trusted Computing Group (TCG)
[4], [5], ARM TrustZone [6] and M-Shield [7].
2Website: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/trust
that an entity has behaved and/or will behave in
accordance with its self-stated behaviour.” The self-
stated purpose of intent is provided by the entity
and this may have been verified/attested by a third
party or trusted manufacturer. The proof that the
entity satisfies the self-stated behaviour can either be
gained through past interactions (experience) or based
on some (hard) evidence like validatable/verifiable
properties certified by a reputable third party (i.e.
Common Criteria evaluation for secure hardware [9])
or based on strong business relationships and non-
digital trust in the manufacturer. This definition is not
claimed to be a comprehensive definition for digital
trust that encompasses all of its facets. However, this
generic definition will be used as a point of discussion
for the rest of the paper.
Elements of Trusted Boot
The core idea is that every part of an AWN
boots to a secure state when the network is powered-
on. The AWN can then provide an assurance to
the aircraft systems that it has securely booted to a
trustworthy and reliable state – before it transits to an
operational state to serve them. The boot process for
trust verification measures the integrity (or any other
properties) of the succeeding individual elements in
this process, before transferring control to them. For
the concept of trusted boot, there are three potential
variants.
Secure Boot: Secure boot is a security validation
during the boot process that ensures that a compo-
nent can only be loaded if the configuration of the
succeeding component is verified. If a modification
is detected, the bootstrap process is interrupted.
Authenticated Boot: Authenticated boot is a
process that ensures that remote parties can verify
the properties (i.e. integrity values) of each of the
components involved in the boot process – the boot
configuration.
Trusted Boot: Trusted boot is a combination
of both the secure and the authenticated boot. The
trusted boot process measures certain properties of
the succeeding boot component (in the boot con-
figuration) and if the properties do not satisfy the
security requirement, it terminates the boot process.
In addition, the trusted boot process can provide a
validation to a third party about its trusted state, when
requested.
In this paper we are mainly concerned with the
trusted boot process, in which all elements of an AWN
node boot up to a secure and validatable state. In
subsequent sections, we first look into how a trusted
boot works based on the Trusted Platform Module
(TPM) and how applications can securely execute in
the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), before we
investigate the three variants of providing trusted boot
mechanisms for an entire AWN.
Secure and Trusted Computing
In the real world, trust in an entity is based
on a feature, property or association that is entailed
in it. In the computing world, establishing trust in
a distributed environment also follows the same as-
sumptions. The concept of trusted platforms is based
on the existence of a trusted and reliable device that
provides evidence of the state of a given system.
How this evidence is interpreted is dependent on the
requesting entity. Trust in this context can be defined
as an expectation that the state of a system is as it
is considered to be: secure. This definition requires a
trusted and reliable entity called a Trusted Platform
Module (TPM) to provide trustworthy evidence re-
garding the state of a system. Therefore, a TPM is a
reporting agent (witness), not an evaluator or enforcer
of the security policies. It provides a root of trust on
which an inquisitor relies for the validation of the
current state of a system.
The TPM specifications are maintained and de-
veloped by an international standards group called the
Trusted Computing Group (TCG)3 Today, TCG not
only publishes the TPM specifications but also the
Mobile Trusted Module (MTM), Trusted Multi-tenant
Infrastructure, and Trusted Network Connect (TNC).
With emerging technologies, service architectures,
and computing platforms, TCG is adapting to the
challenges presented by them.
Trusted Platform Framework
The basic framework for the trusted platform is
to have a root of trust (preferably in the hardware) and
3Trusted Computing Group (TCG) is the culmination of in-
dustrial efforts that included the Trusted Computing Platform
Association (TCPA), Microsoft’s Palladium, later called Next
Generation Computing Base (NGSCB), and Intel’s LaGrande. All
of them proposed how to ascertain trust in a device’s state in a
distributed environment. These efforts were combined in the TCG
specification that resulted in the proposal of TPM.
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Figure 1. Trusted Platform Framework [10]
trust in it is necessary if an entity has to measure the
trustworthiness of a system. The root of trust in the
TCG specifications [4], [5] combines Root of Trust
for Measurement (RTM), Root of Trust for Storage
(RTS), and Root of Trust for Reporting (RTR). The
RTM is an independent computing platform that has
a minimum set of instructions, which are considered
to be trusted for measuring the integrity matrix of a
system. On a typical desktop computer, the RTM will
be part of the BIOS (Basic Input Output System) and
in this scenario, it is referred to as the Core Root of
Trust for Measurement (CRTM). Where the RTS and
RTR are based on an independent, self-sufficient, and
reliable computing device that has a pre-defined set of
instructions to provide authentication and attestation
functionality, such a device is referred to as a Trusted
Platform Module (TPM).
A platform can be considered a trusted plat-
form if it has a TPM and supporting architecture
for the “Trusted Building Block” (TBB). The TBB
includes a CRTM, a physical connection between
the CRTM and the motherboard (of the platform),
a connection between the TPM and the motherboard,
and functionality to detect physical presence. Physical
presence implies the direct interaction of a user with
the platform, which is traditionally based on a secret
credential that in theory is only known to the user.
By verifying the credentials, the platform assumes
that the platform owner is physically present. Figure
1 illustrates the trusted platform framework.
The trust boundary is a combination of the TBB
and roots of trust. A TPM extends the trust from
roots of trust through transitive or inductive trust.
A transitive trust is a process that enables a root of
trust to provide a trustworthy description (e.g. hash
generation) of a second function (e.g. software). The
requesting entity can then verify whether it can trust
the second function based on the description provided
by the relevant TPM. The rationale behind transitive
trust is that if an entity trusts the TPM of a platform,
it will also trust its measurements.
In this section, the discussion of secure and
trusted computing mainly focused on the TPM. There
are other proposals for secure and trusted computing
but none has the status of the TPM specifications. We
will discuss a few of these proposals in later sections,
to contrast with the TPM architecture.
A. Trust and Trustworthiness
From the discussion in this section, we can
delineate two distinct types of trust frameworks: hard
trust and soft trust. The term hard trust refers to
architectures that base the measurement/foundation
of trust on verifiable and independently validated
hardware (e.g. TPM [5], ARM TrustZone [6]). In
contrast, the term soft trust is associated with trust
measurement and assessment mechanisms that do
not rely on trusted hardware: examples of soft trust
can be reputation-, context- and content-based trust
mechanisms.
Hybrid trust combines soft and hard trusts to
provide a potentially comprehensive approach. In
the field of security, a substantial number of trust
proposals can be categorised as hard trust. This is not
to say that soft trust might not be valid or applicable to
the security domain [11], [12]. However, soft trust on
its own might not be the best approach to progressing
with secure and trusted computing. In the rest of the
paper, we discuss hard-trust based mechanisms for
secure and trusted computing.
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Figure 2. Generic Architecture of Trusted Plat-
form Module [5]
Whether a soft, hard or hybrid trust approach
is used, it can be divided into two parts. First is
the trusted measurement and reporting framework
and second is the mechanism to generate a score.
The generated score will represent the trustworthiness
of the relevant entity/information. Data provenance
mechanisms can be used to measure and report the
state/quality of the data [13], [14]. Based on these
measurements and reports, trustworthiness can be cal-
culated; however, data provenance does not become
part of the calculations that ascertain the trustworthi-
ness of data. Similarly, TPM is a trusted and secure
measurement and reporting hardware system, where
the calculation of the trustworthiness of a system is
left to the inquirer (i.e. the entity that requests the
integrity report from the TPM) [15].
Therefore, security and reliability of the trust
measurement and reporting agent are as crucial as
the trustworthiness of the system. The basic premise
is the invariability and effectiveness of the measure-
ment and reporting mechanism even when in the
control of a malicious entity. If a malicious entity
can influence the trust measurement and reporting
mechanisms then calculation of trustworthiness is of
no value. For this reason, hard trust is usually the
preferred choice for providing proof that the trust
measurement and reporting mechanism are reliable
and tamper-resistant, satisfying the requirement for
an effective mechanism even when controlled by an
active adversary. The calculation of trustworthiness is
dependent on the evaluator and it may be independent
of the trust architecture — except for mechanisms
that integrate hard trust with reputation-based systems
[11]. For example, if a malicious user accepts an
untrusted system as trusted, then he/she is taking
the risk. In such systems a malicious user can still
report that system ‘A’ is untrustworthy even when the
trustworthiness of system ‘A’ is high.
Trust in Security and Privacy
In this section, we briefly discuss the TPM and
the Mobile Trusted Module (MTM). Subsequently, we
discuss the initial promise of the trusted computing
initiative and why in reality it did not get the traction
that was expected. Finally, we evaluate the potential
future of trusted computing.
Trusted Platform Module
The basic TPM architecture and its different
components are shown in Figure 2. For in-depth
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discussion of individual components and their func-
tionality please refer to [15], [16].
Secure Boot (Measurement Operation): When
a user boots up her computer, the first component
to power up is the system BIOS (Basic Input/output
System). On a trusted platform, the boot sequence is
initiated by the Core BIOS (i.e. CRTM) that first mea-
sures its own integrity. This measurement is stored in
PCR-04 and later it is extended to include the integrity
measurement of the rest of the BIOS. The Core
BIOS then measures the motherboard configuration
setting, and this value is stored in PCR-1. After these
measurements, the Core BIOS will load the rest of
the code of the BIOS.
The BIOS will subsequently measure the in-
tegrity of the ROM firmware and ROM firmware
configuration, storing them in PCR-2 and PCR-3
respectively. At this stage, the TBB is established and
CRTM will proceed with integrity measurement and
loading of the Operating System (OS).
The CRTM measures the integrity of the “OS
Loader Code,” also termed the Initial Program Loader
(IPL), and stores the measurement in the PCR. The
designated PCR index is left to the discretion of the
4Platform Configuration Register (PCR): A Platform Config-
uration Register (PCR) is a 160-bit (20 bytes) data element
that stores the result of the integrity measurement, which is
a generated hash of a given component (e.g. BIOS, operating
system, or an application). Therefore, a group of PCRs form the
integrity matrix. The process of extending PCR values is: PCRi =
Hash(PCR
′
i||X), where i is the PCR index, PCR′ i represents the
old value stored at index i, and X is the sequence to be included
in the PCR value. “||” indicates the concatenation of two data
elements in the given order. The starting value of all PCRs is set
to zero.
OS. Subsequently, it will execute the “OS Loader
Code” and on its successful execution, the TPM
will measure the integrity of the “OS Code”. After
measurement is made and stored, the “OS Code”
executes. Finally, the relevant software that initiates
its execution will first be subjected to an integrity
measurement, and values will be stored in a PCR then
sanctioned to execute. This process is shown in Figure
3, which illustrates the execution flow and integrity
measurement storage.
By creating a daisy chain of integrity measure-
ments, a TPM provides a trusted and reliable view
of the current state of the system. Any software,
whether part of an OS or an application, has an
integrity measurement stored in a PCR at a particular
index. If the value satisfies the requirement of the
software or requesting entity, then it can ascertain
the trustworthiness of the system or otherwise take
action. As discussed before, a TPM does not make
any decisions: it only measures, stores, and reports
integrity measurements in a secure and reliable man-
ner. When a TPM reports an integrity measurement,
it is recommended that it should generate a signature
on the value - avoiding replay and man-in-the-middle
attacks [5].
Reporting and Attestation Operations: The at-
testation process, whether initiated by the relevant
user/administrator/third-party locally or remotely, in-
volves the generation of a signature using the re-
spective Attestation Identification Key (AIK) on the
(associated/requested) PCR values [10]. The signature
assures requesters of the validity of the integrity
measurement stored in the PCRs. The choice of the
AIK and PCR index is dependent on the respective
user, platform (OS) or application.
Trust in Execution Environment
In this section we briefly introduce some of
the proposals for a secure and trusted application
execution and data storage.
ARM TrustZone: Similar to the MTM, the ARM
TrustZone also provides the architecture for a trusted
platform specifically for mobile devices. The underly-
ing concept is the provision of two virtual processors
with hardware-level segregation and access control
[6], [17]. This enables the ARM TrustZone to de-
fine two execution environments described as Secure
world and Normal world. The Secure world exe-
cutes the security- and privacy-sensitive components
of applications and normal execution takes place in
the Normal world. The ARM processor manages the
switch between the two worlds. The ARM TrustZone
is implemented as a security extension to the ARM
processors (e.g. ARM1176JZ(F)-S, Cortes-A8, and
Cortex-A9 MPCore) [6], which a developer can opt
to use if required.
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GlobalPlatform Trusted Execution Environment
(TEE): The TEE is GlobalPlatform’s initiative [18]–
[20] for mobile phones, set-top boxes, utility meters,
and payphones. GlobalPlatform defines a specification
for interoperable secure hardware, which is based
on GlobalPlatform’s experience in the smart card
industry. It does not define any particular hardware,
which can be based on either a typical secure element
or any of the previously discussed tamper-resistant
devices. The rationale for discussing the TEE as one
of the candidate devices is to provide a complete
picture. The underlying ownership of the TEE device
still resides with the issuing authority, which is similar
to GlobalPlatform’s specification for the smart card
industry [21].
Trust in the Underlying Hardware
In the early days of computing systems, security
was associated with the software. However, recent
commercial and economic conditions have forced
hardware manufacturers to outsource their production
process to countries with cheaper infrastructure costs.
While this significantly reduces the integrated circuit
(IC) production costs, it also makes it much easier
for an attacker to compromise their supply chain
and replace ICs with unoriginal or malicious ones.
Such items could be counterfeits or hardware Trojans.
This threat to the IC supply chain is already a cause
for alarm in some countries [22], [23]. For this
reason, some governments have been subsidising a
few high-cost local foundries for producing the ICs
used in military applications [24]. However, this is
not an affordable solution for most of the developing
countries.
Counterfeits: Counterfeiting on the global level
covers almost everything that is made or manufac-
tured, from spare parts to clothing to prescription
drugs. In contrast to other counterfeit items, the
ramifications of a counterfeit IC device failure in an
electronic system are more than just inconvenience
or a minor loss of money. According to [25], the
number of counterfeit incidents increased from 3,868
in 2005 to 9,356 in 2008. These incidents can have
the following ramifications: (a) original IC providers
incur an irrecoverable loss due to the sale of often
cheaper counterfeit components; (b) low performance
of counterfeit products (that are often of lower quality
and/or cheaper older generations of a chip family)
affects the overall efficiency of the integrated systems
that unintentionally use them, which could in turn
harm the reputation of authentic providers; and (c)
unreliability of defective devices could render the
integrated systems that unknowingly use the parts
unreliable, this potentially affects the performance of
weapons, airplanes, cars or other crucial applications
that use the fake components [26].
Hardware Trojans: Hardware Trojans are mali-
cious circuitry implanted in an IC. The malicious cir-
cuit can be inserted for a variety of reasons, including
stealing sensitive information, IP reverse engineering
or spying on the user. One way of implanting a Trojan
into an IC is by compromising the supply chain
of ICs and adding a Trojan mask into the original
design. Trojan circuits are designed to be very difficult
(nearly impossible) to detect by purely functional
testing. They are designed to monitor for specific
but rare trigger conditions; for instance specific bit
patterns on received data or the bus. Once triggered,
the actions of the Trojan could be leaking secrets,
creating glitches to compromise the security of larger
electronic equipment, or simply disabling the circuit.
For example, a simple yet deadly Trojan in RSA [27]
could be to inject a fault into the CRT inversion step
during RSA signature computation that could lead to
the compromise of the RSA keys [28].
Countermeasure
Counterfeit ICs and hardware Trojans can be
designed to be hard to detect by purely functional
testing. However, in the real world ICs also leak
information about their internal state unintentionally.
This leakage comes via power consumption or elec-
tromagnetic emissions caused by varying electric cur-
rents flowing through the IC’s circuitry. This leakage
can be recorded and analysed to detect counterfeits
and hardware Trojans. For instance in [29], a gate-
level passive hardware characterisation of an IC was
proposed to identify defective ICs. However, the gate-
level characteristics are dependent on ageing, tem-
perature and supply voltage instability. The authors
used the negative bias temperature instability model
proposed in [30] to calculate the original characteris-
tics of aged ICs. In another proposal [31], the power
consumption of a device was proposed for detecting
hardware Trojans implanted in ICs. In this study,
process variation noise modelling (constructed using
genuine ICs) is used for detecting ICs with Trojan
circuits through statistical analysis.
Potential Solutions for Trusted Boot
Process in AWN
In this section, we first discuss how trust and
trustworthiness can be established in a digital avionics
systems and specifically in AWNs. In this section, we
will look into how a trusted architecture can be build
in an AWN deployment and then how aircraft systems
or maintenance crew can verify the status of all the
nodes in the AWN.
Trusted Architecture for AWN
As discussed before, the trust starts with the
hardware. If there is the potential to have a hardware
Trojan in a node, then any security or trust mechanism
built on top on this hardware can be vulnerable.
Therefore, AWN designers should make sure that the
chip fabrication foundry is trustworthy. Even with that
provision, they should vet individual chips received
back from the foundry to verify that no Trojan was
introduced in order to weaken the security of the chip.
After ensuring that individual nodes are manu-
factured in a trusted fashion, individual nodes should
be instantiated using their individual root of trust
(TPM). This might generate a set of public key pairs,
one for encryption and other for signature scheme.
These key pairs can then be used to provide integrity
measurements to an authorised requesting entity in a
secure and reliable manner.
The root of trust would provide an assurance that
the device is booted to a secure state, as the secure
state is known to the requesting entity (or its integrity
value, which might be provided to the requesting
entity as a manufacturer’s signed message or by
some other means). After receiving the assurance that
the device is booted to a secure/trusted stated, the
TEE would provide a strong assurance that during
the execution of sensitive parts of the application
on individual nodes, no on-board application could
alter or interfere with the execution of these sensitive
instructions.
AWN nodes can respond to requesting entities’
queries about their current state via three different
schemes, as follows:
Individual Querying Solution
In this scheme, the requesting entity has to
request information from the trusted integrity mea-
surement nodes individually. The pros of this scheme
are that the requesting entity does not have to query
all the nodes every time an AWN boots up. It can
randomly select a subset of the nodes in the AWN and
query them. This random selection can also provide
a low performance penalty and the AWN can become
operational quickly. The downside of such a scheme
is that the requester might overlook a node that is not
in a secure/trusted state until it is randomly selected
– possibly after a long delay. During this period the
node might keep on operating in a less secure and/or
trusted state.
Peer-to-Peer Querying Solution
In this scheme, there is no centralised entity
that requests individual nodes in the AWN to pro-
vide their trusted integrity measurements. In peer-to-
peer querying schemes, individual nodes query all
(communicating) partner nodes for their trusted state.
Individual nodes then make the decision whether the
node they are going to communicate with in the
operation phase is trustworthy or not. If not, then
the querying node might raise an error and notify
the AWN management node or aircraft system, in
order to rectify the problem. The positive aspect of
this scheme is that on every power-up for the AWN,
states of all nodes are verified. Furthermore, as it
is a decentralised scheme all nodes don’t have to
be individually queried by a centralised entity (i.e.
aircraft system). A potential shortcoming of such a
scheme is that individual nodes have to store the
trusted state of all their partner nodes, to compare
with the integrity value they return when queried.
Collective Querying Solution
A collective query scheme enables the cen-
tralised requesting entity to only send one request
to the AWN. This request is then propagated in the
AWN, and all nodes in the AWN then individually
respond to the request. A positive aspect of this
scheme is that the requesting entity does not have to
send individual requests to each node, which might
be costly in terms of both computational perfor-
mance and network communication (load). A poten-
tial downside of such a scheme is that all nodes have
to generate the integrity measurement (encrypt/sign
it) and then send it to requesting entity. This offsets
the benefit achieved by sending only a single request
over the network. A point to note is that when a
node provides an integrity measurement to the request
entity, it might include some unique string of bits
sent to it by the requesting entity to ensure freshness.
Furthermore, the AWN node will then encrypt/sign
the integrity measurement and unique string of bits
and send them back to the requesting entity. This
process is common to all three solutions listed above.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have analysed the requirements
for a digital trust mechanism for AWN deployments.
Furthermore, we looked into the nature of digital
trust and what technological solutions can be used to
provide it in the context of an AWN. This discussion
was necessary in order to show how digital trust
architectures are created in computer systems and
how to query them to obtain trust assurances.
We also discussed how these technological so-
lutions can be used in three different deployment
scenarios to provide a trusted boot for an AWN. The
aim was to provide an assurance to a requesting entity
that all nodes in an AWN are booted to a trusted state
and the network as whole is secure and trustworthy.
Any security protocols that then execute after the boot
process can have a strong assurance that they are
running on a device that is in a secure state.
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